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RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN
NEW YORK LAW
HOLDING THAT AN INSURANCE COMPANY
HAD NO DUTY TO DISCLOSE A LIFE-
THREATENING MEDICAL CONDITION
HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR A NEW
APPROACH
RONALD PALMESE JR.t
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that your spouse has recently suffered a fatal heart
attack. While most heart diseases can be treated if detected
early, certain heart diseases, if not attended to, can result in a
life-ending myocardial infarction or a heart attack.
Furthermore, suppose that your spouse's prospective life
insurance company learned two months earlier, when it received
the results of a physical examination, that he/she had severe and
extensive atherosclerotic disease. The insurance company never
informed you or your spouse of the test results because it did not
believe it was required to do so under current law.
For many Americans, an insurance company's failure to
disclose potentially life-saving information is not a hypothetical
situation; rather, it is a devastating reality that has destroyed
countless families. Take the recent case of Petrosky v. Brasner,1
in which the First Department in New York ruled that an
insurance company had no obligation to disclose to a prospective
applicant that his coverage was being denied because he had
t J.D. Candidate, June 2003, St. John's University School of Law; B.S.B.A.,
May 2000, Georgetown University.
1 718 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1st Dep't 2001).
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heart abnormalities. 2 The court reasoned that nothing in the
nature of Petrosky's relationship with the defendants could give
rise to reasonable reliance on it for health information. 3
Consequently, Mrs. Petrosky was left with a dead husband and
no life insurance coverage in effect for her husband's death.
The outcome in Petrosky is troubling. It is the position of
this Recent Development that such a duty to disclose a life-
threatening medical condition should extend to insurance
companies and prospective insureds. A duty should be imposed
not only because the silence of an insurance company leads to
reliance by a prospective insured but also because the social
utility of disclosure outweighs the burden to the insurance
company. Part I of this Recent Development provides
information regarding when a duty to disclose is generally
imposed and presents the facts and holding of Petrosky. It
further explains the 'court's rationale for ruling that the
insurance company had no affirmative duty. Part II discusses a
case in the First Department, McKinney v. Bellevue Hospital,4
involving an employer and an employee, where the court ruled
that a common law duty to disclose did exist between an
employer and an employee/prospective employee. Part II then
analogizes the situation in McKinney to Petrosky and asserts
that the Petrosky court should have similarly imposed a duty to
disclose on the defendants to reveal to Mr. Petrosky the results
of his physical examination. Part III analyzes New York
Insurance Law section 2611(c), explores the legislature's
intention in creating this statute, and argues that its enactment
should not foreclose the courts from finding an independent duty
to disclose. Part IV presents legal arguments for imposing a
duty to disclose on insurance companies, and Part V points to
the policy arguments for doing so. Part VI discusses why the
creation of a duty to disclose is an appropriate judicial function.
This Recent Development concludes by determining that the
decision in Petrosky effectively denied Mr. Petrosky his legal
right to be informed of a life-threatening medical condition.
2 Id. at 343.
3 Id.
4 584 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1st Dep't 1992).
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I. PETROSKY V. BRASNER: FAILING TO IMPOSE A DUTY TO
DISCLOSE A LIFE-THREATENING MEDICAL CONDITION
It is well settled that a duty of reasonable care owed by a
defendant to a plaintiff is elemental to any recovery in
negligence. 5 The law does not generally impose a duty to
disclose, absent a fiduciary or confidential relationship, 6
requiring instead some affirmative misrepresentation before
imposing liability.7  Nonetheless, a failure to disclose the
existence of a known danger may be the equivalent of
misrepresentation where it is expected that another person will
rely upon the appearance of safety.8 Recently, however, the First
Department in Petrosky v. Brasner ignored this rule, holding
instead that liability would not be imposed upon the defendants
for failing to disclose decedent's heart disease because they
neither affirmatively mislead the prospective insured nor
foreseeably induced him to forgo otherwise necessary treatment. 9
On February 3, 1997, decedent Frank Petrosky ("Mr.
Petrosky") filed an application for life insurance with defendant
insurance agent Steven Brasner ("Mr. Brasner"), employed by
defendant Fabricant and Fabricant, a general agent of the
United States Life Insurance Company ("U.S. Life"). 10  On
February 11, 1997, defendant technician Brett Jensen ("Mr.
Jensen"), from defendant Examination Management Services,
Inc. ("EMSI"), performed pre-issuance medical tests on Mr.
Petrosky, including an electrocardiogram ("EKG"), at the
direction of U.S. Life." The results of the EKG were then sent to
6 See, e.g., Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1020 (N.Y. 1976); Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
6 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Joshi, 609 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (1st Dep't 1994) (finding
no liability because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate either a fiduciary or a
confidential relationship).
7 See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 675 (1st Dep't 1991) (holding
that "some affirmative misrepresentation or partial disclosure is required to impose
upon the seller [of real estate] a duty to communicate undisclosed conditions
affecting the premises").
8 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
33, at 205-06 (5th ed. 1984).
9 Petrosky v. Brasner, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 343 (1st Dep't 2001).
10 R. Appeal at 80-81, Petrosky v. Brasner, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1st Dep't 2001)
(No. 98-105000) (Application for Policy). Mr. Brasner worked for Fabricant and
Fabricant, a general agent of U.S. Life, who completed and filed an application for
life insurance on the life of Mr. Petrosky. Id. at 81.
11 Id. at 83; Record at 299-302 (Affidavit of Robert Bishop, Medical Director of
EMSI) [hereinafter Bishop Aff.]. Jensen also drew blood and urine from Mr.
2002l 1049
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U.S. Life for analysis. 12 The laboratory tests showed that Mr.
Petrosky had abnormalities of the heart, and U.S. Life therefore
refused to issue the policy for the specific terms in the insurance
application. 13 This position, however, was never communicated
to Mr. Petrosky before he suffered a heart attack and died on
April 11, 1997.14 Autopsies revealed severe and extensive
atherosclerotic disease.' 5
Plaintiff, Mrs. Barbara Petrosky ("Mrs. Petrosky"), was
thereafter advised that there was no U.S. Life insurance
coverage in effect for her husband's death.1 6 Mrs. Petrosky filed
suit against Mr. Brasner, Fabricant and Fabricant, U.S. Life,
Mr. Jensen, and EMSI, and each moved for summary judgment.
The action alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing
to disclose to decedent the results of his physical examination,
namely the EKG results which revealed heart abnormalities. All
of the defendants argued that they had no duty to obtain or
Petrosky and took a reading of his blood pressure. Bishop Aff. at 301.
12 Bishop Aff. at 301.
13 Record at 242-43 (Affidavit of Steven Zimmer, Mrs. Petrosky's former
attorney). U.S. Life decided to offer Mr. Petrosky an alternative "tobacco users"
policy at a lower face value and shorter term, which alternative was communicated
to insurance agent Mr. Brasner. Record at 84 (Amendment to Application).
14 Record at 232-39 (Affidavit of Tom Pratt, General Manager and Treasurer of
Scatt Materials; Affidavit of Jay Boyle, Secretary of Mount Hope Asphalt Company;
Affidavit of Barbara Koferl). Prior to his death, Mr. Petrosky worked at both Scatt
Materials and Mount Hope Asphalt Company. Id. There were phone messages
exchanged between Mr. Petrosky and Brasner, but Mr. Petrosky received no
communication with reference to his application and no information about the
results of the physical examination. Id. at 238-39.
15 Record at 245 (Affidavit of Dr. Martin Hoffman, specialist in the field of
cardiology). Dr. Hoffman reviewed both the autopsy report relating to the death of
Mr. Petrosky as well as the certified medical records of Brookhaven Memorial
Medical Center relating to his treatment there on the date of his death. Id. Hoffman
was of the opinion, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the EKG
might have been sufficient to, enable a qualified physician to diagnose either the
coronary artery blockage or the heart condition from which Mr. Petrosky was
suffering at the time the EKG was performed. Id. It was also his opinion that the
condition that caused Mr. Petrosky's death could have been treated if diagnosed
prior to April 12, 1997. Id. Both the IAS court and the First Department had to
accept Dr. Hoffman's opinion as true on the defendants' summary judgment
motions.
16 See Record at 240 (Affidavit of Karen Miller, Legal Secretary employed by
the Law Firm of Zimmer and Mazzei). Although there was no coverage in effect for
Mr. Petrosky's death, Mr. Brasner had told Mrs, Miller that the policy was in order,
and it would just be a matter of time before the claim was paid. See id. Mr. Brasner
left Mrs. Miller with the distinct impression that the policy existed and the claim
would be processed. See id.
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reveal the test results of the EKG. Additionally, Mr. Jensen,
EMI, Mr. Brasner, and Fabricant contended that they never
possessed any knowledge of the test results.
Whether there exists a legal duty on the part of a life
insurer to disclose adverse medical information to an applicant
to whom it rejects coverage was a matter of first impression in
New York. The Supreme Court, New York County, granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss Mrs. Petrosky's claim. The court
granted U.S. Life's motion, reasoning that the defendant owed no
duty to disclose data obtained from a physical examination it
had performed on Mr. Petrosky pursuant to his application for
insurance;17 the claim was dismissed against the remaining
defendants because they never possessed the information
regarding Mr. Petrosky's physical examination.' 8
The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the
lower court decision, holding that liability should not be imposed
upon the defendants because they neither affirmatively misled
Mr. Petrosky nor foreseeably induced him to forgo otherwise
necessary treatment.19 The court reasoned that Mr. Petrosky
was not examined by a physician and was specifically advised
that the tests were not administered in the routine course of the
application process and were not for the purposes of treatment.
Additionally, the court found no indication that Mr. Petrosky
relied on the defendants for anything other than approval for life
insurance.20 Furthermore, the broad duty of disclosure alleged
did not arise by virtue of New York Insurance Law section
2611(c), which applies only to the discovery of HIV-related
tests. 21 Other lower courts have since agreed with the majority
opinion in Petrosky.22
17 Petrosky v. Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281, 286 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999),
af/'d, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1st Dep't 2001). The trial court noted that nothing in the
process could have been interpreted by Mr. Petrosky as an inducement to forgo
medical examination or attention, nor was there evidence that Mr. Petrosky had
been induced to refrain from monitoring his health. Id.
18 Id. at 287.
19 See Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
20 Id. ("Nothing in the nature of Petrosky's relationship with [defendants] could
give rise to a reasonable reliance on it for health information despite the apparent
abnormal EKG, the precise nature of which is not revealed.").
21 Id. ("Had the Legislature intended to extend the duty to the within
circumstances, it would have expressly done so.").
22 See Nolan v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 81, 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001) (ruling that no duty existed under New Jersey law requiring insurance
20021 1051
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Justice Saxe, dissenting, nonetheless argued that an
insurance company has "a legal duty to notify the prospective
insured of [test] results" which reveal a "potentially life-
threatening medical condition."23 He asserted that "such a duty
could be satisfied with only a minimal effort, and does not
impose an onerous burden on the insurance industry."24
Moreover, Justice Saxe contended that the "imposition of the
duty in such circumstances comports with established law."25
The failure to disclose the existence of a known danger was the
equivalent of misrepresentation where it was to be expected that
Mr. Petrosky would rely upon the appearance of safety.26 Lastly,
he rejected defendant's suggestion that it must be inferred from
New York Insurance Law section 2611(c) that the legislature
intended no duty be imposed upon insurers to disclose test
results of any kind other than HIV tests.27
Justice Saxe restated the rule enunciated earlier by the
First Department that a duty exists in a negligence action "when
a prospective employer learns through a pre-employment
physical of a job applicant's potentially life-threatening
condition. '28 He saw no reason to arrive at a different conclusion
where a prospective insured learns of a potentially life-
threatening condition through a physical examination of a
companies to disclose all pre-insurance examination results or even blood results to
potential insured parties). The Nolan court reasoned that the legislature, not the
judiciary, could create such a duty upon insurance companies. Id. at 87.
23 Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (Saxe, J., dissenting). Justice Saxe would have
"modiflied] the order on appeal so as to deny the motion insofar as it sought
summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against [U.S. Life]." Id. Regarding
the other defendants, he agreed with the majority that they never possessed the
information resulting from the analysis of the specimens and the EKG that Mrs.
Petrosky alleged they were duty bound to disclose. See id.
24 Id. (Saxe, J., dissenting)
25 Id. (Saxe, J., dissenting) (citing McKinney v. Bellevue Hosp., 584 N.Y.S.2d
538 (1st Dep't 1992)).
26 Id. at 346 (Saxe, J., dissenting) ("[Diefendant was.., in possession of
information of critical importance to plaintiff.... [Tihe critical factor is ... that the
applicant would naturally believe, in the absence of any notification of a serious
problem, that the silence following the physical examination meant that no
indication of a critical health problem had been discerned.").
27 Id. at 347 (Saxe, J., dissenting) ("[In enacting that provision, the Legislature
was merely focusing its attention on the ongoing effort toward preventing the
spread of contagious, deadly illness, which effort requires large-scale, society-wide
actions.").
28 Id. at 344 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
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prospective insured.29 According to Justice Saxe, because the
average person, "in circumstances like Mr. Petrosky's, would
tend to interpret the insurer's silence as an indication that no
serious medical conditions were apparent in the test results it
received, the law should impose upon the insurer a duty to
disclose such results."30
II. RECOGNIZING A DUTY TO DISCLOSE A LIFE-THREATENING
MEDICAL CONDITION FOR EMPLOYERS AND EXTENDING THAT
DUTY TO INSURANCE COMPANIES
A. McKinney v. Bellevue Hospital
New York law does not generally recognize a duty to
disclose, insisting instead on some affirmative misrepresentation
before imposing liability.31 Nonetheless, "a failure to disclose the
existence of a known danger may be the equivalent of
misrepresentation, where it is to be expected that another will
rely upon the appearance of safety."32 In McKinney v. Bellevue
Hospital, the First Department held that the failure to inform a
prospective employee that his pre-employment physical detected
a serious medical condition was an act of negligence. 33 It is
asserted here that the Petrosky court should have similarly
found that defendants had a duty to disclose Mr. Petrosky's
heart disease. Mr. Petrosky was equally justified in expecting
that the discovery of a life-threatening disease would be
communicated to him.34
29 See id. (Saxe, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 347 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
31 See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 675 (1st Dep't 1991) (holding
that "some affirmative misrepresentation or partial disclosure is [normally]
required to impose upon the seller of real estate a duty to communicate undisclosed
conditions affecting the premises").
32 McKinney v. Bellevue Hosp., 584 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (1st Dep't 1992) (quoting
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at
179 (4th ed. 1971)).
33 Id. ("[Tihe silence of the employer induced reliance by the plaintiff on his
general good health and resulted in the failure to seek treatment, to his obvious
detriment.... ."). The court further commented that "[t]he tendency of the average
person, in similar circumstances, to interpret the employer's silence as an indication
of good health [was] so apparent, and the consequence of such reliance so potentially
serious, that we conclude the law imposes a duty to disclose upon the employer." Id.
The First Department ultimately affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the
complaint because service of notice of the complaint was untimely. Id.
34 Although Petrosky was advised that the tests were part of the application
2002] 1053
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In McKinney, plaintiff McKinney received a pre-employment
physical examination, including a chest x-ray, as part of his
application for a position at Bellevue Hospital. 35 The defendant,
Dr. Melinda Staiger, reviewed the x-ray. Dr. Straiger's report
stated that she saw an "irregular agrigate [sic] density in the left
lung apex."36 McKinney was hired by Bellevue Hospital without
ever being informed of these results.37 The McKinney court
concluded that "the silence of the employer induced reliance by
plaintiff on his general good health and resulted in the failure to
seek treatment, to his obvious detriment."38 Furthermore, "It]he
tendency of the average person, in similar circumstances, to
interpret the employer's silence as an indication of good health
[was] so apparent and the consequences of such reliance so
potentially serious that [the court] conclude[d] that the law
imposes a duty to disclose upon the employer."39 Because the
situation in McKinney parallels that in Petrosky, the Petrosky
court should have extended that reasoning and ruled in favor of
the now widowed Mrs. Petrosky.
B. Reliance
In deciding that prospective and actual employees are owed
a duty of disclosure, the courts have focused on the issue of
reliance. 40  For purposes of reliance, there is no difference
between an employee examinee and an insurance applicant
examinee.41 Both must submit to physical examinations and
medical tests and, therefore, are understandably susceptible to
process and not for treatment, he knew that the medical examinations would be
carefully evaluated in determining his insurability and in assessing the risk. R.
Appeal at 96-97, Petrosky v. Brasner, 718 N.Y. S.2d 340 (1st Dep't 2001) (No. 98-
105000).
35 McKinney, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
36 Id. at 539. Her clinical impression is stated as: "Differential diagnosis
between pyoinflammatory disease such as tuberculosis verses [sic] possible lung
neoplasm." Id.
37 Id. In June 1988, McKinney "was examined at Booth Memorial Hospital and
informed that he had a tumor." Id. He returned to Bellevue Hospital and had
additional x-rays, confirming the diagnosis. Id.
38 Id. at 540.
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., id.
41 See Hannah E. Greenwald, Comment, What You Don't Know Could Save
Your Life: A Case For Federal Insurance Disclosure Legislation, 102 DICK. L. REV.
131, 159 (1997).
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reliance.42 Furthermore, at the time of the examination, neither
the employees nor the insurance applicants have a contractual or
fiduciary relationship with the employers or insurers, whom
require the examination. Therefore, in order to prevent
unwarranted assumptions of good health, insurance companies
should have the same duty of disclosure as employers.
C. Similarities Between Insurance Companies and Employers
There is no justification for ignoring the reasoning of the
McKinney court in the circumstances surrounding Mr. Petrosky
and defendant insurers. 43 Even if a special relationship can be
said to exist between an employer and employee, the McKinney
court applied its reasoning to prospective employees as well, and
no special relationship can be said to exist between a prospective
employer and a mere job applicant.
Because there are no apparent differences between cases
involving employers and insurers, insurance companies ought to
be held to the same standard as employers. Employers who
require their prospective and actual employees to submit to
medical examinations are also acting in their own self-interest,
similar to insurance companies. 44 Therefore, the contention that
an employer's duty to disclose is justified because an employer
42 See Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238, 246 (D.D.C. 1974) ("When...
a physical examination [is performed], the examinee generally assumes that 'no
news is good news' and relies on the assumption that any serious condition will be
revealed."); see also Meinze v. Holmes, 532 N.E.2d 170, 173-74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)
(establishing that the employer's duty to notify the job applicant of test results is
not dependent upon the existence of a physician-patient relationship between the
job applicant and the physician interpreting test results). The Meinze court asserted
that "[tihe duty to disclose will arise under circumstances when a reasonable
physician.., would disclose a significant risk or danger to the person being
examined." Id.
43 See Petrosky v. Brasner, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 346 (1st Dep't 2001) (Saxe, J.,
dissenting) ("No valid distinction can be made between a prospective employer and
a prospective insurer who know of test results indicating the presence of a
potentially life-threatening medical condition in an application, whether it be for a
job or for an insurance policy.").
4 Greenwald, supra note 41, at 159-60:
They are using the exam results to assess an individual's ability and
suitability for employment, much in the same way insurance companies
test to determine the insurability of an applicant. Just as insurance
companies may use the results of their examinations to deny coverage,
employers may use the test results to "exclude people from jobs."
Id.; see Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information in
the Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75, 87 (1991), cited in Greenwald, supra, at 160.
2002] 1055
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performs the test for the benefit of both the employer and the
employee is unavailing. Also, insurers and employers use many
of the same medical tests to make their decisions.4 5 Lastly,
employees, prospective employees, and insurance applicants
alike have no control over the process. 4
6
D. Applicability to Physicians and Non-Physicians Alike
It should make no difference that the professional who
interpreted Mr. Petrosky's test results was a medical
professional other than a physician. This view departs from the
rule announced in Doe v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.4 7
The Doe court opined that when a physician has conducted an
exam, provided medical judgments, or assumed an advisory role,
the employee examinee has a "right to expect a certain degree of
care and disclosure on their health and health related matters
regardless of whether a doctor/patient relationship exists."48
The court was unwilling to conclude that an insurance
company should bear the same burden as a physician,49 finding
instead that "[t]o hold insurance companies to the same standard
as physicians would be to expect expertise on health related
matters from an entity which hasn't [sic] the knowledge or the
resources." 50 A rule limiting the duty to circumstances when a
physician conducted the test or interpreted the test results
would permit an insurance company to avoid liability simply by
employing non-physician technicians to evaluate and interpret
45 Greenwald, supra note 41, at 160 ("Employers require their employees to
submit to x-rays, urine samples, blood tests, and HIV tests.").
46 See Frances H. Miller, Biological Monitoring: The Employer's Dilemma, 9
AM. J.L. & MED. 387, 413 (1984) ("Job applicants may not relish being screened for
health problems, but in most circumstances they are powerless to refuse if they
want to be hired."); Greenwald, supra note 41, at 160 ("In order to have the
opportunity to secure a job, to keep a job, or to procure insurance, they have to
acquiesce to the demands of the employers and insurers.").
47 944 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (applying Mississippi law), affd sub
nom. Derasmus v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam).
48 Id.
49 To justify this conclusion, the court distinguished between a physician and
an insurance company by ruling that the former "is sworn to protect and respect
human life" while the latter, "by insuring those individuals it perceives as
'insurable,' is here to soften the blow of natural and artificial disasters, be it death,
fire or flood." Id. at 495.
50 Id.
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the results of medical tests.51 The rule announced by the Doe
court is wrong because it ignores the fact that prospective
applicants rely on these test results as an indicator of their
health. Without a duty to disclose, insurance companies will
continue to induce unsuspecting individuals into believing that
they are healthy, even though they may actually have a life-
threatening medical condition.
Language from the Ohio Court of Appeals in Meinze v.
Holmes, however, suggests that a duty to disclose could arise
either "because the physician has examined the insured
personally or has reviewed his confidential medical records."52
Ultimately, despite attempts to justify disparate treatment of
employers and insurers because of the use of physicians, such
reasoning fails because insurance companies use physicians as
well.53 In Petrosky, for example, Mr. Petrosky's test results were
also analyzed by a trained physician, the medical director at U.S.
Life.54 Therefore, the court should have similarly imposed a duty
upon the defendant insurance company.
III. NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW § 2611(c)
Despite the enactment of New York Insurance Law section
2611(c), it should not be inferred that the legislature intended
that no duty be imposed upon insurers to disclose test results of
51 See Petrosky v. Brasner, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 346 (1st Dep't 2001) ("If an
insurer in possession of troubling test results may be said to have a duty to disclose
those test results if they were obtained by a physician, there should be no different
result where some other form of medical professional or technician obtained them.").
52 Meinze v. Holmes, 532 N.E.2d 170, 174 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) ("Th[e] duty
arises because the physician has examined the insured personally or has reviewed
his confidential medical records, and he has thus assumed a professional and expert
position with respect to the insured's physical condition 'and well-being, even though
a doctor-patient relationship has not been created."). The Petrosky court erred in
following the rule in Doe v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 860 F. Supp.
243, 251-52 (D. Md. 1993), that a physician must "personally" perform the tests
before a duty to disclose will exist. See Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 343. The
Prudential ruling would never find a duty to disclose life threatening test results,
even where the insurance company has trained physicians and medical directors
analyzing the results of the tests, but the physicians do not actually perform the
tests. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 860 F. Supp. at 252.
53 See JOSEPH MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 250-56 (1962). Every life insurance
company has a medical director who is a licensed physician and whose duties
include reviewing the report of every examination conducted on their applicants. Id.
54 See Record at 301, Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340 (No. 98-105000) (Bishop Aff.,
110) (indicating that Petrosky's confidential records were reviewed by a trained
physician, but the tests were taken by a non-physician).
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any kind other than HIV tests. 55 Section 2611(c) is one of several
legislative measures taken throughout the country to curtail the
harm that results from non-disclosure. 56 Currently, twenty-nine
states require insurance company disclosure for those infected
with HIV.57 There have even been attempts to pass a federal
insurance disclosure law that would require disclosure of all
results of application medical tests.58
A. The Legislative History of New York Insurance Law Section
2611(c)
The Legislative History suggests that New York Insurance
Law section 2611(c) was designed merely to clarify the issue of
when, and to whom, HIV-related information may be disclosed. 59
Attempting to control the spread of AIDS, the legislature
enacted the statute in order to provide confidentiality protections
to infected persons. 60 Because the transmission rate of the AIDS
55 Section 2611(c) provides:
In the event that an insurer's adverse underwriting decision is based in
whole or in part on the result of an HIV related test, the insurer shall
notify the individual of the adverse underwriting decision and ask the
individual to elect in writing, unless the individual has already done so,
whether to have the specific HIV related test results disclosed directly to
the individual or to such other person as the individual may designate.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 2611(c) (Consol. 2001).
56 See Greenwald, supra note 41, at 148-49 (commenting that two of the main
harms arising from a policy of non-disclosure by insurance companies are the loss of
treatment time and the health risk to others).
57 Id. at 132-33; see, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 799.03 (Deering 1992); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.429 (West 1996).
58 See Greenwald, supra note 41, at 138 ("The [Medical Privacy in the Age of
New Technologies] Act imposes an absolute duty on insurance companies to disclose
to applicants the results of their medical examinations. It provides that individuals
must have 'access to health information of which they are subject.' "). Congress,
however, has not passed the Act.
59 See Mem. of Sen. John R. Dunne, S. 211-584, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1988),
reprinted in N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIvE ANNUAL 1988, at 234 ("The purpose of this bill
is to require informed consent and pre-test and post-test counseling for HIV-related
testing and to provide confidentiality protections for HIV-related information.").
60 Senator Dunne commented:
In its final report, the President's Commission on the HIV Epidemic noted
that confidentiality protections are the cornerstone of any public health
strategy to control the spread of AIDS, because all available strategies rely
on the voluntary cooperation of those at risk. Fear of breaches of
confidentiality may discourage those at risk from using available health
and social services to learn their HIV status and be counseled on how to
prevent future infection or transmission of the virus.
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virus had reached epidemic proportions, 61 the statute was
created with the intention of encouraging those infected to seek
medical assistance, not to limit the duty of disclosure to those
infected with HIV.62
In enacting the provision, the legislature focused its
attention on preventing the spread of a contagious and deadly
illness, the accomplishment of which requires society-wide
action.63 Yet, although New York Insurance Law section 2611(c)
only applies to HIV, it should not be inferred that the legislature
intended for a duty to be imposed on insurance companies solely
in this context. In order to encourage those infected with HIV to
seek treatment, it was imperative that this statute be enacted.
Its enactment, however, should not preclude courts from defining
a judicially imposed duty of disclosure on insurance companies.
B. Representing a Vocal Minority
It seems incongruous that Insurance Law section 2611(c)
should clearly protect a vocal minority in this country, namely
those infected with AIDS, while overlooking the silent majority
of individuals suffering from some form of heart disease. More
than 700,000 cases of AIDS have been reported in the United
States since 1981, and as many as 900,000 Americans may be
infected with HIV, a figure that includes those who already have
AIDS.64 Nonetheless, those suffering from AIDS represent a
minority of Americans who suffer from life-threatening diseases.
In contrast, cardiovascular disease is the number one killer
in the United States,65 with more than sixty-one million
Americans having some form of cardiovascular disease.66 Every
61 See Greenwald, supra note 41, at 149.
62 See Mem. of Sen. John R. Dunne, S. 211-584, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1988),
reprinted in N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 1988, at 235 ("This bill reinforces and
expands the confidential relationship between individuals at risk of HIV infection
and providers of health or social services who are likely to obtain such information
in the course of their work.").
63 See Petrosky v. Brasner, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 347 (st Dep't 2001) (Saxe, J.,
dissenting).
4 See David Brown, 4 of 10 People With H1V Get Late Diagnosis; For Many,
Awareness Comes After Infection Has Done Much Damage or Advanced Into AIDS,
WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2001, at A3.
65 See Jonathan Fielding & Valerie Ulene, Life After Heart Attack Can Be
Normal, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2001, at 3.
66 NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH
PROMOTION, ABOUT CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE (2002), at http://www.cdc.gov/cvh/
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year approximately 950,000 Americans die of cardiovascular
disease, amounting to one death every thirty-three seconds. 67
Because many more Americans are at risk of developing heart
disease in contrast to contracting AIDS, it would be wrong to
conclude that, in enacting section 2611(c), the legislature
intended to bar the imposition of a duty upon insurers to disclose
test results other than HIV tests. It did not preclude the courts
from imposing a similar duty in other types of circumstances.
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT FOR IMPOSING A DUTY TO DISCLOSE A
LIFE-THREATENING MEDICAL CONDITION ON INSURERS
There is a strong legal basis supporting the argument that
insurers should have a judicially created duty to disclose. Judge
Learned Hand's famous risk-utility formula strongly suggests
that insurance companies should inform applicants of the results
of their applications. 68 Because of the minor burden disclosure
imposes and the significant probable risks to life presented by a
policy of non-disclosure, insurance companies should have a legal
duty of disclosure.69 Moreover, the claim that an insurance
company, unlike an employer, is not well equipped to diagnose a
disease is mistaken.70 To the contrary, insurance companies are
aboutcardio.htm.
67 NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH
PROMOTION, PREVENTING HEART DISEASE AND STROKE: ADDRESSING THE NATION'S
LEADING KILLERS (2002), at http://www.cdc.gov/cvh/cvdaag.htm.
68 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (to
determine the extent of the defendant's duty in a negligence case, three factors
should be considered: 1) the probability that the accident will occur if no precautions
are taken; 2) the magnitude of the injury if the accident occurs; and 3) the burden of
taking adequate precautions that would prevent the accident). Judge Hand stated
the formula thus, "[I]f the probability be called, P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is
less than] PL." Id.
69 See Greenwald, supra note 41, at 150.
The magnitude of the injury if the insurance company does not disclose the
life-threatening information (L) is the exacerbation of the illness because of
the loss of treatment time or death of the ill applicant as well as the
possible infection of third parties. ... The likelihood that such injuries will
occur if the insurance company does not disclose the life threatening
information (P) is also very high as an individual who does not know she is
sick will do nothing to help herself. Lastly, the burden (B) on the insurance
company of informing the applicant of her illness is, in comparison,
insignificant.
Id. at 152.
70 See Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that both
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equipped to release to a prospective insurance applicant not only
his or her medical diagnosis but also the full test results.
A. Harm Resulting from an Insurer's Failure to Disclose
Nondisclosure endangers not only the insurance applicant
but also dozens of third parties with whom the applicant
interacts. The most basic harm resulting from an insurance
company's failure to inform an individual that they are suffering
from a critical medical condition is the loss of treatment time.71
Courts have required employers to notify employees of
examination results,72 and such a disclosure requirement should
exist in the insurance context as well.73 Had Mr. Petrosky, for
example, been notified by U.S. Life that he had a serious heart
condition, he might have averted his premature death. 4
Accordingly, the rule requiring disclosure of life-threatening
illnesses in employment cases should apply equally to pre-
insurance physicals.75
In addition to loss of treatment time, the failure to disclose
an applicant's medical condition can result in serious health
risks to third parties if the undisclosed condition is
communicable. Nonetheless, the Deramus court recently faced
insurers and employers ask applicants to submit to x-rays, urine samples, blood
tests, and HIV tests); see also R. Appeal at 305, Petrosky v. Brasner, 718 N.Y.S.2d
340 (1st Dep't 2001) (No. 98-105000) (Affidavit of Brett Jensen) (acknowledging that
insurance companies hire and employ physicians to review results of the
examinations).
71 See ERROL C. FRIEDBERG, CANCER ANSWERS: ENCOURAGING ANSWERS TO 25
QUESTIONS YOU WERE ALWAYS AFRAID TO ASK 148 (1992) (asserting that early
diagnosis and early treatment are significant factors in improving the chance of
curability in cancer patients as well as those with heart disease).
72 See generally James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
(imposing a duty on the employers where employees were not aware of their
condition and thereby lost valuable treatment time).
73 See Greenwald, supra note 41, at 149 ("[Rlegardless of this implied notice
and actual knowledge, the fact still remains that under the current nondisclosure
system, insurance companies can exclusively control information that might save or
prolong lives.").
74 See R. Appeal at 245, Petrosky (No. 98-105000) (Affidavit of Dr. Martin
Hoffman). There was a high degree of medical certainty that the EKG could have
indicated a serious heart condition. Id. Dr. Hoffman, an expert witness on behalf of
Mr. Petrosky, further stated, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the
conditions that caused Mr. Petrosky's death might have been treated if they had
been diagnosed earlier. Id.
75 See McKinney v. Bellevue Hosp., 584 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (1st Dep't 1992)
(imposing disclosure requirements for pre-employment physical).
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such a situation but declined to find a duty to disclose. 76 The
argument can be made that the prevention of serious health
risks is the responsibility of the individuals involved and not of
the insurance companies. Yet, when an insurance company has
information that could potentially save numerous lives,
disclosure of such information should be required.
B. Burden on the Insurance Company from Disclosure
In comparison to the magnitude and likelihood of injury
resulting from the insurance company's non-disclosure of a life-
threatening medical condition, the burden on the insurance
company of informing the applicant of her illness is insignificant.
The insurance company could simply add another paragraph to
its response letters and attach a copy of the test results. The
letter need only explain that the applicant might have a very
serious illness and should see a physician immediately. Leaving
it to the insurance companies to decide which test results should
be released to the applicant's physician is insufficient. 77
Insurance companies should be legally obligated to disclose all
information.
V. POLICY ARGUMENT FOR IMPOSING A DUTY TO DISCLOSE A
LIFE-THREATENING MEDICAL CONDITION ON INSURERS
Courts have alluded to policy considerations in determining
whether a duty exists. Such policy considerations include: the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered the injury; the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered; the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
the policy of preventing future harm; the extent of the burden to
the defendant and the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach; and availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved. 78
76 See Deramus v. Jackson Natl Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1996)
(determining that under Mississippi law, the insurance carrier had no duty to
disclose, despite the fact that the plaintiff had a contagious disease, namely AIDS).
77 See Chuck Jones, I Know Something You Don't Know, LIFE ASs'N NEWS, Nov.
1996, at 41.
78 See, e.g., Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D. Md. 1993)
(quoting Vill. of Cross Keys, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 556 A.2d 1126 (Md.
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Clearly, a duty to disclose should be placed on insurance
companies. It is certainly foreseeable and likely that injury will
result to an individual who has not received information from an
insurance company that his policy was denied because he has a
life-threatening medical condition. A person who does not know
that he is sick will not procure treatment and in certain
circumstances will not take necessary measures to avoid
infecting others. Furthermore, by exempting insurance
companies from disclosure requirements, it is likely that the
individual's health will deteriorate. Mr. Petrosky was denied the
opportunity to seek treatment from a cardiologist because he was
unaware of his cardiovascular disease.
It was undisputed that Mr. Jensen advised Mr. Petrosky
that the tests were not for the purpose of treatment or
evaluation by Mr. Jensen; however, this fact should not be
determinative of Mrs. Petrosky's claim. Insurance contracts
have been referred to as "contracts of adhesion" in view of the
disadvantageous bargaining position which generally exists
between the parties and, under such circumstances, are
normally construed against the insurer.7 9 Although the New
York Court of Appeals has held that a "contract for insurance is
no different than any other contract,"80 it has recognized "[tihe
tendency on the part of the courts to treat insurance contracts as
standing in a class by themselves."81
Clearly, Mr. Petrosky was in a disparate position with U.S.
Life and the other defendants with regard to negotiating the
terms of the policy. While Mr. Petrosky was aware that the tests
were not intended for evaluation, he, like most Americans,
surely believed that U.S. Life would, at the very least, disclose
any life-threatening medical conditions that were detected
during the examination. Mr. Petrosky would never have
imagined that his abnormal EKG results would be withheld from
him. As a result, Mr. Petrosky was unable to seek necessary
medical treatment. It would be inexcusable for the defendants to
escape liability because Mr. Petrosky relied, to his detriment, on
their silence.
1989)).
79 See generally 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 626 (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961).
80 Drilling v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 137 N.E. 314, 316 (N.Y. 1922).
81 Satz v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 153 N.E. 844, 846 (N.Y. 1926).
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Because an insurer might be the only one with both the
knowledge of the health condition and the ability to prevent
further harm, there is a causal link between the non-disclosure
by insurance companies and the potential for an applicant's
health to deteriorate as a result of this policy. Additionally, from
a practical standpoint, the companies should disclose this
information simply because they possess it. Furthermore, since
McKinney, New York has imposed a duty to disclose on
employers; there is no reason not to extend this duty to
insurance companies. Thus, the combination of risk-utility and
policy considerations dictates that New York law should impose
a legal duty of disclosure on insurance companies in order to
diminish the instances of health deterioration that stem from a
policy of non-disclosure.
VI. CREATING A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
The Petrosky court did not impose a duty to disclose life-
threatening medical conditions to a prospective insured because
of the absence of a statutory mandate. The court reasoned that
it was neither the function nor the mission of the court to
assume the role of the legislature in creating such an
obligation.8 2 Part of the task of a court operating within the
common-law tradition, however, is to determine the propriety of
imposing a duty upon a party in a particular situation.
In McKinney, for example, the First Department imposed a
common-law duty on employers and prospective employers to
disclose life-threatening medical conditions.8 3 A duty was found
there primarily because the employer's silence gave the
employee a misdirected sense of good health; the consequences of
the reliance were so serious; the burden upon the employer was
so slight; and in contrast, the benefits of disclosure to the public
were so great.
While it is traditionally the function of the legislature to
make policy, it is also the function of the court to either create
duties or expand legislation as the court deems necessary.8 4 Like
82 Petrosky v. Brasner, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 343 (1st Dep't 2001).
83 McKinney v. Bellevue Hosp., 584 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (1st Dep't 1992) (holding
that the silence of the employer, which induced reliance by plaintiff, acted as an
affirmative misrepresentation, thereby imposing liability).
84 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)
(applying a risk-utility analysis in determining whether or not to impose a duty on
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legislation, the common law has historically developed and
grown in response to changes in society. The court would not be
acting like a super-legislature by imposing a duty on insurance
companies to disclose life-threatening , medical conditions
because it has already imposed this duty on employers. Rather,
it would simply be continuing the common law tradition of
speaking on a subject on which the legislature has not spoken.8 5
Thus, the Petrosky court would have been acting properly in
expanding the duty to disclose to insurance companies.
CONCLUSION
In concluding that defendant insurance company owed no
duty to Mr. Petrosky, the court in Petrosky has denied the
deceased and others in New York their right to be notified of a
potentially life-threatening disease. The reasoning enunciated
in McKinney is no less applicable in the present case. Because
the average person, in circumstances like Mr. Petrosky's, would
tend to interpret the insurer's silence as an indication that no
serious medical conditions were apparent in his test results, the
law should impose upon an insurer a duty to disclose such
results.
barge carriers).
85 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 124
(1921) ("[Tihe power to declare the law carries with it the power, and within limits
the duty, to make law when none exists ....").
20021 1065
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
1066
